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REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT*
INTRODUCTION
The right of a reporter to refuse to disclose the source and substance
of confidential information obtained in the course of gathering news re-
cently has been the subject of heated debate.' Proponents have identified
the three avenues available for the establishment of a reporter's privilege:
common law recognition, legislative action, and constitutional recogni-
tion.2 Militating against acceptance of a common law privilege, however,
is the well-established principle that "the public . . has a right to every
man's evidence."3 Deviations from this rule are "distinctly exceptional"'
and do not include a reporter's privilege.5 Thus, no jurisdiction has ever
acknowledged a common law reporter's privilege.6 Due to the absence of a
* This article is a student work prepared by Angela M. DeMeo, a member of the ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
See, e.g., Dixon, The Constitution is Shield Enough for Newsmen, 60 A.B.A.J. 707 (1974);
Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARv. J. LEGis. 233 (1974); Hume, A Chilling Effect
on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, § 6 (Magazine), at 13; Rosenthal, The Press Needs
a Slogan - 'Save the First Amendment,' N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
2 See Note, Branzburg Revisited: The Continuing Search for a Testimonial Privilege for
Newsmen, 11 TULSA L.J. 258 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Branzburg Revisited].
3 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (rev. ed. McNaughton 1961) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
Id. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), wherein the Supreme Court stated that
"exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth." Id. at 710 (footnote omitted).
I According to Wigmore, there are four elements that must be present for a communication
to be recognized as privileged under the common law: First, the communication must be
confidential. Second, confidentiality must be necessary to the relationship between the par-
ties to the communication. Third, the relationship between these parties must be one which
the community deems worthy of protection. Fourth, the possible adverse impact that nonre-
cognition of a privilege would have upon the relationship must outweigh the potential benefit
to be derived from disclosure. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2285. Wigmore expressly concluded
that the reporter-confidential informant situation does not satisfy these four requirements.
Id. § 2286.
' The New York Court of Appeals decision in People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York
County, 269 N.Y. 291, 199 N.E. 415 (1936), is illustrative of the approach of the state courts
to the question of a reporter's common law privilege. In Mooney, a reporter had refused to
testify before a grand jury investigating gambling offenses. In refusing to recognize a common
law privilege for reporters, the court reasoned that the general policy of the law is to require
disclosure by all witnesses. As an exception to this rule, in certain situations a privilege from
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common law privilege, several states have enacted statutes providing some
degree of protection for a newsman's confidential information.' Unfortun-
ately, these statutes lack uniformity in scope and type of qualifications
imposed.' Since most press communications involve contacts with more
disclosure exists. Since these privileges often interfere with the administration of justice, the
court found, the trend is to restrict rather than expand the classes of individuals to whom a
privilege is granted. The Court of Appeals concluded that if a reporter's privilege is to be
recognized, the legislature is the proper body to create it. Id. at 294, 199 N.E. at 416. Courts
in other jurisdictions have reached similar results. See Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 48
P. 124 (1897); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo. 297, 184 P. 375 (1919); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136
Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (1913).
In addition to not extending a common law evidentiary privilege to reporters, courts have
rejected other arguments against compelled disclosure of confidential information. Thus,
although it might violate a code of ethics, or office rules, or result in the loss of employment,
disclosure may be ordered. See, e.g., In re Wayne, 4 Haw. Dist. Ct. 475 (1914); Clein v. State,
52 So. 2d 117, 120 (Fla. 1950) (en banc); People ex rel Phelps v. Fancher, 2 Hun. 226 (N.Y.
Gen. T. 1st Dep't 1874); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 70 S.E. 781 (1911). See generally
Comment, Compulsory Disclosure of a Newsman's Source: A Compromise Proposal, 54 Nw.
U.L. REV. 243, 247-48 (1959).
1 Statutes which protect a newsman's confidential sources from compulsory disclosure are
commonly known as "shield laws." The following states have enacted such legislation: ALA.
CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1973); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-2237 (Supp.
1976); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (Deering Supp. 1977); DEL.
CODE tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1970); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-1454 (West Supp. 1977); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-
112 (1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-025 (West
Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-701-4(8) (Supp. 1975); NEa. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144
to -147 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Page 1953); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 385.1-.3 (West Supp. 1976-1977); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-.540 (1975);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1 to -3
(Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Supp. 1976).
Under some statutes, a reporter is afforded an absolute privilege. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit.
7, § 370 (1958); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (Deering Supp. 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1
(Burns Supp. 1976); NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.275 (1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Supp. 1976).
Other states place a limitation upon the exercise of the privilege. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
09.25.150 (1973) (privilege yields if a miscarriage of justice would result or if contrary to public
interest); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964) (no privilege if bad faith with malice shown and
publication not in the interest of public welfare); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45.1451-.1454
(West Supp. 1977) (disclosure permitted when essential to public interest); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975) (privilege available unless disclosure essential to prevent injustice);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976) (privilege available unless general or specific
law to the contrary exists); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976) (no privilege if failure to
disclose would cause a miscarriage of justice); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 385.1-.3 (West
Supp. 1976-1977) (privileges available unless relevant to significant issue in action and no
alternate source exists). Moreover, in some states only the source of the reporter's information
is privileged. See, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-3-5-1 (Burns Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45.1451-.1454 (West Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1976); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978), while in other jurisdictions the information
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than one state, it is difficult for a newsman to rely on a state's statutory
privilege.'
The claim to a constitutional reporter's privilege is based on the first
amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press. 0 To safeguard the public's
right to know, the newsgathering process has been afforded protection
under the first amendment." Advocates of a privilege for reporters contend
that this protection should be extended to ensure the confidentiality of a
reporter's information and sources.'2 Since fear of exposure deters sources
from revealing their information to reporters, it is argued, the failure to
recognize a reporter's privilege significantly impairs the ability of the press
to keep the public informed. 3 Opponents of the privilege counter this
itself is protected. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (Deering Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE tit. 10,
§§ 4320-4326 (1974); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 767.5a (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-
.025 (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§
44.510-.540 (1975).
For a discussion of shield legislation in the United States see Note, State Newsman's
Privilege Statutes: A Critical Analysis, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 150 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as State Newsman's Privilege]. See also Branzburg Revisited, supra note 2, at 267-72; 4 MEM.
ST. U.L. REV. 143, 148-50 (1973).
In at least one state, enactment of a shield law has been held to be beyond the compe-
tency of the legislature. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551
P.2d 1354 (1976), wherein it was held that a statute creating a newsman's privilege is violative
of a provision of the state constitution which empowers the State Supreme Court to establish
rules of procedure for the lower courts.
' See Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953), involving a libel action commenced
in a federal court in New York prior to the enactment of that state's shield law. Sparrow, a
reporter, had refused to disclose the source of his information during pretrial examination in
Alabama, a shield law state. The allegedly libelous article concerned activities which oc-
curred in Alabama, but the article was published in New York. The court applied the Ala-
bama shield statute since the deposition had been sought in that state. In a later case, Cepeda
v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), it was held that in pretrial examinations the
privilege rule of the forum state governs. Cf. Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603, 608 (7th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 965 (1956) (rule of the forum state applied to quash subpoena
and suppress a deposition taken in forum state for exclusive use in litigation in second state).
See generally State Newsman's Privilege, supra note 8, at 151-56.
, U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press .... "
" See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411
F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) (mem.); Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
(mem.); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.); Morgan
v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
21 See generally Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confiden-
tial Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 326-34 (1970). For a detailed analysis of the constitutional
argument see Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument For Newsmen Concealing
Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969).
" See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.).
But see Caldero v. Tribune Publishing, 45 U.S.L.W. 2429 (Idaho Mar. 4, 1977), wherein the
court held a reporter in contempt of court for refusing to reveal his informant's identity during
pretrial discovery. The newsman had argued that "disclosure of information acquired by a
reporter from confidential sources would have a 'chilling effect' on the ability of reporters to
utilize such sources, and would therefore inhibit the ability of the press to gather news and
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argument by pointing out that there is scant evidence indicating that news
sources actually are silenced due to fear of disclosure." Additionally, it is
urged that a privilege would be abused by newsmen and result in injury
to the judicial process.'5 Nonetheless, some courts recently have evinced a
marked tendency to recognize, in certain instances, a qualified constitu-
tional privilege for reporters.' 6 The purposes of this Note are to trace the
historical development of the concept of a constitutional privilege for re-
porters and to ascertain its current status.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Garland v. Torre
A significant case in the development of a constitutional privilege for
reporters is Garland v. Torre." There, Judy Garland commenced an action
against CBS, asserting that a CBS executive had been the source of a
libelous newspaper column. The author of the column was called to testify,
but she refused to reveal the source of her information. On appeal from a
conviction for criminal contempt, the reporter argued that the identity of
her source was privileged under the first amendment.' 8 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit sustained the conviction, holding that a re-
porter may be compelled to disclose his sources when such information is
material, relevant, and goes to the "heart" of the plaintiff's claim." In
reaching this result, the court balanced "the . . public interest in the fair
administration of justice" against the possible impairment of the free flow
of news that might be occasioned by compelled disclosure and concluded
that the former should prevail in this instance. 0 The Second Circuit did
suggest, however, that if the "identity of the news source is of doubtful
relevance or materiality," it may be constitutionally protected."
In the years following Garland, few cases addressed the constitutional
issue. The courts that reached the question often applied a balancing
inform the public." Id. at 2430. The court rejected this argument and refused to "accept the
premise that the public's right to know the truth is somehow enhanced by prohibiting the
disclosure of truth in the courts of the public." Id.
" See Beaver, The Newsman's Code, the Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to
Evidence, 47 ORE. L. REv. 243, 251-52 (1968).
11 Id. at 257-58. But see Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 229, 259-74 (1971).
" See, e.g., Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) (mem.); Load-
holtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (mem.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214
Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974); notes 53-82 infra.
' 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
259 F.2d at 547-48.
" Id. at 550.
,0Id. at 548-49.
" Id. at 549-50. The Garland court also indicated that disclosure might not be ordered in a
situation where "the judicial process [is being used] to force a wholesale disclosure of a
newspaper's confidential sources of news .... " Id. at 549.
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
approach similar to the Second Circuit's and concluded that the need for
testimony outweighed any resulting encroachment upon newsgathering.2 2
Consequently, the claim to a constitutional reporter's privilege usually was
rejected.3 At this time, however, the demand for a reporter's privilege had
not reached its peak. In the late 1960's the United States Department of
Justice, in what appears to be 6 departure from its past practices, issued
a large number of press subpoenas. 4 As a result, the issue of a newsman's
privilege became a topic of intense media discussion and public concern. 5
It was in this setting that a case concerning the reporter's privilege contro-
versy, Branzburg v. Hayes,26 reached the Supreme Court.
22 See, e.g., Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (mem.), cert.
dismissed, 402 U.S. 901 (1971) (director of news agency ordered to disclose source of informa-
tion in defamation action against agency); In re Goodfader's Appeal, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d
472 (1961) (reporter forced to disclose the identity of an informant who had notified him of a
civil service employee's impending dismissal); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729
(en banc), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968) (college newspaper writer ordered to reveal source
of drug-use article to grand jury).
21 See note 22 supra.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
970 (1973) (newspapers, television stations and magazines served with subpoenas covering all
items in their possession connected with the Democratic National Convention); Note, Beyond
Branzburg: The Continuing Quest For a Reporter's Privilege, 24 SYaACUSE L. REV. 731, 739-
40 (1973); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case for a Federal
Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160 (1976) wherein it is noted that in the first few years of
the Nixon administration
124 subpoenas were served on either CBS or NBC. . . . The Chicago Sun-Times and
the Chicago Daily News received a total of 30 subpoenas - two thirds of them by
government officials - and one reporter, Duane Hall of the Sun-Times was served in
11 separate proceedings within 18 months. . . . In addition, the Chicago Tribune
estimated that from 1967 through 1972, approximately 75 to 100 "dragnet subpoenas"
were served on the newspaper or its employees.
Id. at 162 n.13 (citations omitted).
25 See, e.g., Adelson, The Subpoena Siege: Have the News Media Become Too Big To Fight?,
SATURDAY REVIEW, Mar. 14, 1970, at 106; N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1970, at 1, col. 1; Comment,
Newsmen's Immunity Needs a Shot in the Arm, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 56 (1970).
26 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The Branzburg decision involved three cases consolidated on appeal.
In Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held that a
reporter is entitled to a privilege unless it is established that the state has a compelling and
overriding interest in the reporter's information:
"When the exercise of the grand jury power of testimonial compulsion so necessary
to the effective functioning of the court may impinge upon or repress First Amendment
rights. . . which centuries of experience have found to be indispensable to the survival
of a free society, such power shall not be exercised . . . until there has been a clear
showing of a compelling and overriding national interest that cannot be served by any
alternative means."
434 F.2d at 1086, (quoting In re Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970)).
. In Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972), a reporter for the Louisville Courier Journal had refused to disclose the
identity of his source to a grand jury investigating drug activity in Kentucky. The Kentucky
court held that since the reporter was a witness to the criminal conduct being investigated,
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Branzburg v. Hayes
In Branz burg, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that
the first amendment does not relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation
to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a
criminal investigation.Y Reasoning that "the First Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press, '2 8 the Court concluded
that the public interest in fair and effective law enforcement overrides the
consequential, but uncertain, burden on newsgathering that results from
compelled disclosure. 9 The Branzburg Court indicated, however, that
since "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protection,"3 a
different result might be reached if the grand jury investigation was insti-
tuted or conducted in bad faith: "Official harassment of the press under-
taken not for the purposes of law enforcement but to disrupt a reporter's
relationship with his news sources would have no justification."', More-
over, the majority pointed out that its decision does not preclude the
enactment of shield legislation by Congress and state legislatures nor pre-
vent state courts from recognizing a newsman's privilege under their own
constitutions22
the first amendment did not require that the reporter be exempted from testifying. 461
S.W.2d at 347-48.
Finally, In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), aff'd sub nom. Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), involved a photographer who had refused to relate observations
made in a Black Panther headquarters to a grand jury investigating civil disorders. 358 Mass.
at 605, 266 N.E.2d at 298. The court held that the reporter was not entitled to a constitutional
privilege, reasoning that this result would only have an "indirect, theoretical, and uncertain"
influence on newsgathering. Id. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302.
27 408 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 690. In addition, the Court stated that disclosure would not necessarily lead to a
complete unavailability of news sources, but conceded that it would impede the flow of news
by deterring some individuals from furnishing information to newsmen. See id. at 693-94.
" Id. at 707. In the course of its opinion, the Court emphasized the preeminent position of
first amendment freedoms:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly to the country's
welfare. Nor is it suggested that newsgathering does not qualify for First Amendment
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press
could be eviscerated. But these cases involve no intrusions upon speech or assembly
Id. at 681.
1I d. at 707-08.
32 At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's
privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or
broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to
refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit
in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own
standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to the relations between
law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course,
that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and constru-
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Justice Powell, in a brief but significant concurring opinion, empha-
sized the limited nature of the holding.13 Declaring that "the courts will
be available to newsmen . . . [when] legitimate First Amendment inter-
ests require protection, 34 he stressed that the Court had not abrogated the
constitutional rights of newsmen with respect to newsgathering. Instead,
Justice Powell suggested, the Branzburg decision indicates that a claim of
privilege should be judged on a case-by-case basis "by . . striking . . . a
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all
citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. '3
This proposed balancing approach has proven to be extremely influential
in subsequent decisions."
Dissenting from the majority's refusal to recognize a privilege, Justice
Stewart contended that newsmen are entitled to a limited testimonial
privilege under the first amendment. 7 In Justice Stewart's opinion, protec-
tion of the newsgathering process is necessary to guarantee freedom of the
press. 8 Utilizing a balancing approach, he formulated a three-pronged test
under which a reporter is granted a privilege unless the interest in protect-
ing first amendment freedoms is outweighed by the public interest in the
administration of justice:
[W]hen a reporter is asked to appear before a grand jury and reveal confid-
ences, I would hold that the government must (1) show that there is probable
cause to believe that the newsman has information that is clearly relevant
to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information
sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest
in the information.3 9
Despite the willingness of the concurring and dissenting Justices" to
ing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified
or absolute.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
1, Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
36 See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974);
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Apicella
v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.); Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt.
1974).
7 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The majority rejected an approach
similar to the one proposed by Justice Stewart. See id. at 701-02. The Court suggested that
the adoption of such an approach would force the state to establish that a crime has been
committed and that the reporter is the sole source of the relevant information-in effect
perform the function of the grand jury-as a prerequisite to the effective operation of the
grand jury. See id. at 702; Note, Reporter's Privilege-Guardian of the People's Right to
Know?, 11 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 405, 413 (1976).
"o Justice Douglas authored a separate dissenting opinion. 408 U.S. at 711 (Douglas, J.,
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recognize a limited reporter's privilege in certain situations, post-
Branzburg decisions continually have compelled journalists to disclose in-
formation to a grand jury in the absence of bad faith on the part of the
government.' In response to Branzburg ,42 members of the media called for
the adoption of absolute shield laws,43 and many states did enact shield
statutes.44 Newsmen must still look to the judiciary, however, for the estab-
lishment of a uniform privilege.
dissenting). According to Mr. Justice Douglas, a reporter "has an absolute right not to appear
before a grand jury .... " Id. at 712. Reasoning that the interest in the free flow of informa-
tion outweighs the need for a reporter's testimony, Justice Douglas found that a first amend-
ment privilege would be unavailable only when the reporter himself is implicated in the crime
being investigated by the grand jury. Id. Since the journalist is entitled to a fifth amendment
privilege in the event that he is accused of criminal activity, the Justice concluded, the
newsman's privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury is absolute. Id. In the course of
his opinion, Justice Douglas criticized the use of a balancing approach when first amendment
rights are at issue, stating that "all of the 'balancing' was done by those who wrote the Bill
of Rights. . . .[They cast] the First Amendment in absolute terms .... " Id. at 713.
1 See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Lightman v.
State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Ct. Spec. App.), aff'd per curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295
A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d
3 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
991 (1973).
If a reporter refuses to disclose confidential information to a grand jury, he may be
imprisoned until he relents or the grand jury term expires. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970)
which provides:
(a) Whenever a witness . refuses without just cause . to testify . the court,
• . .may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the
witness is willing to give such testimony . . . .No period of such confinement shall
exceed the life of -
(2) the term of the grand jury . . .. but in no event shall such confinement
exceed eighteen months.
In fact, several journalists have been jailed for refusing to divulge their sources. See, e.g.,
Rosato v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (5th Dist. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (four newsmen held in contempt and required to serve jail terms);
51 N.C.L. REv. 1550, 1551 n.4 (1973).
11 Immediately after Branzburg, the debate concerning a reporter's privilege intensified, as
is suggested by the large volume of articles which appeared. See, e.g., Hume, A Chilling Effect
on the Press, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, §6 (Magazine), at 13; Isaacs, Beyond the Caldwell
Decision:-'There May Be Worse to Come from This Court', COLUM. JOURNALISM Rev. 18
(Sept•/Oct. 1972); Rosenthal, The Press Needs a Slogan - 'Save the First Amendment,' N.Y.
Times, Feb. 11, 1973, §6 (Magazine), at 16; Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for
Statutory Protection of News Sources, 61 Ky. L.J. 551 (1973); Comment, Branzburg, Caldwell
and Pappas - A Quick Lateral Pass to Congress, 8 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 336 (1973). See
also Ervin, In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. LEGIS. 233, 255-75 (1974).
,1 See, e.g., Demand for Absolute Privilege Marks Final Hearings on News Protection, [1972]
12 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2125. See generally Califano, Shielding the Press, NEW REPUBLic, May
5, 1973, at 21; Dixon, The Constitution Is Shield Enough for Newsmen, 60 A.B.A.J. 707
(1974); Comment, Newsmen's Privilege Against Compulsory Disclosure of Sources in Civil
Suits - Toward an Absolute Privilege?, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 173, 185 (1973).
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 10, §§ 4320-4326 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-.025 (West
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THE CURRENT STATUS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
Uncertainty exists concerning whether Branzburg completely pre-
cludes the recognition of a constitutional privilege for reporters., Since the
opinion is subject to varying interpretations, privilege proponents have
been successful in claiming a qualified privilege in both civil and criminal
proceedings." An analysis of the decisions concerning the existence of a
privilege in these different proceedings reveals, it is submitted, a develop-
ing trend on the part of courts to sustain a qualified constitutional re-
porter's privilege.
The Controversy In Grand Jury Proceedings
After Branzburg, the possibility that a constitutional privilege would
be established to protect a reporter's sources and information in the grand
jury room became doubtful as courts in both New Jersey and Maryland
summarily dismissed first amendment claims. The New Jersey Superior
Court, in In re Bridge," held that Branzburg precludes the finding of such
a privilege and therefore refused to balance the competing interests. 8 In
Supp. 1977); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 385.1-.3 (West Supp. 1976-1977); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-113 (Supp. 1976).
Although a number of bills providing for a reporter's privilege have been introduced,
Congress has not created a statutory privilege. See Note, Reporter's Privilege - Guardian of
the People's Right to Know?, 11 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 405, 414-15 nn.47-50 (1976). Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal common law is determinative of all questions of
evidentiary privilege except those arising in diversity cases:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense
as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance
with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
1 See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966
(1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.); Mor-
gan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
16 See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) (mem.); Loadholtz v. Fields,
389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (mei.); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D.
78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976); Brown v. Common-
wealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
,1 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d
78 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973).
14 In Bridge, a reporter was held in contempt and jailed for refusing to reveal his source of
information to a grand jury. In addition to rejecting Bridge's claim to a constitutional privi-
lege, the court held that the journalist had waived his statutory privilege under N.J. STAT.
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Lightman v. State,"5 a Maryland court reached a similar result, finding
that neither the United States Constitution nor the Maryland Constitution
creates a privilege in the grand jury situation.50 The federal courts also
have found that there is no privilege in a grand jury proceeding absent a
showing that the investigation is being utilized to harass the press. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Lewis v. United States,5" re-
stated the guidelines set down in Branzburg and found that since the
proceeding was conducted in good faith, no qualified first amendment
privilege existed.2 Significantly, these decisions concern grand jury inves-
tigations of criminal activity. Therefore, it appears that a reporter will not
be afforded a constitutional privilege during a grand jury proceeding which
involves the investigation of a criminal matter.
When the conduct under investigation by the grand jury is not crimi-
nal in nature, however, a privilege may be granted. Recently, in Morgan
v. State,53 the Supreme Court of Florida determined that a qualified re-
porter's privilege exists in such a situation. In Morgan, a grand jury had
been impaneled to investigate the alleged violation of a Florida statute
that proscribes disclosure of grand jury proceedings." A reporter who had
ANN. § 2A:84A-29 (West 1976) by previously disclosing his source. 120 N.J. Super. at 466,
295 A.2d at 6.
In a subsequent article, Bridge expressed his own views on the privilege controversy. He
stated that "what newsmen must have is not a 'privilege' but legal support for a profound
responsibility." Bridge, A Jailed Reporter Tells His Story, STUDENT LAW., Dec. 1972, at 12.
11 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149, aff'd per curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973).
11 Lightman, a newsman who had prepared a story on drug use, refused to reveal the location
of a local "pipe shop" or the identity of its operator. The reporter claimed in his article that
he had observed the shopkeeper allowing customers to use marihuana in testing pipes offered
for sale. 15 Md. App. at 715, 294 A.2d at 151.
The Lightman court viewed Branzburg as a bar to the recognition of a privilege for
reporters under the United States Constitution and refused to create such a privilege under
the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 726-27, 294 A.2d at 157. Since-the state shield law,
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1974), protects sources but not personal observa-
tions, it was found inapplicable. In so holding, the court pointed out that Lightman never
had made a promise of confidentiality to the shopkeeper; in fact, the shopkeeper was unaware
of the reporter's actual status. Thus, in the court's opinion, neither the identity of the shop-
keeper nor the location of the store constituted a source within the meaning of the shield
statute. 15 Md. App. at 725, 294 A.2d at 157.
51 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), aff'g In re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 133 (C.D. Cal.
1974).
11 Lewis had received a communique from the New World Liberation Front which claimed
responsibility for bombing a Los Angeles hotel. The grand jury subpoenaed the original
document but Lewis refused to produce it. 517 F.2d at 237. Significantly, the substance of
the communiqu6 already had been made public. 384-F. Supp. at 136. The Ninth Circuit held
that disclosure could be compelled since there were reasonable grounds to believe that the
information was essential, the material was unavailable elsewhere, and the investigation was
conducted in good faith. 517 F.2d at 239.
53 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 1976).
11 The conduct under investigation, disclosure of grand jury proceedings, was allegedly viola-
tive of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.24 (West 1973) which provides that "[girand jury proceedings
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published a synopsis of a sealed grand jury presentment was called before
the grand jury and asked questions concerning the source of her informa-
tion. Upon refusing to answer these questions, the reporter was adjudged
guilty of contempt. Reasoning that Branzburg did not preclude the invoca-
tion of a constitutional privilege before a grand jury that is probing non-
criminal activity, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the conviction. 5
Notwithstanding this decision, it appears that a reporter will be compelled
to testify in a criminal grand jury proceeding.
The Controversy In Criminal Proceedings
A limited first amendment privilege was recognized in a criminal ac-
tion" subsequent to Branzburg by the Supreme Court of Vermont. In State
v. St. Peter,57 a journalist apparently had received information that a drug
raid was about to occur and was present at police headquarters when the
raid began. The persons arrested in the raid sought disclosure of the source
of the reporter's information during a pretrial discovery proceeding. The
reporter refused to reveal his source, claiming that the information was
privileged, irrelevant, immaterial, and unnecessary. 58 The Vermont Su-
preme Court, applying a balancing test, concluded that the reporter's testi-
mony was constitutionally protected. Under the test formulated by the
court, disclosure may be compelled in a discovery proceeding when there
is "no other adequately available source for the information" and the
information is "relevant and material on the issue of guilt or innocence." 59
are secret, and a grand juror shall not disclose the nature or substance of the deliberations or
vote of the grand jury."
15 337 So. 2d at 954. In support of its holding, the court observed that the attempt to force
disclosure constituted harassment of the press and thus was improper under Branzburg. Id.
at 956.
"' In most criminal cases the courts have utilized a balancing approach. See, e.g., Farr v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 60, 99 Cal. Rptr. 342 (2d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1011 (1972). Farr, a Los Angeles newspaper reporter, was jailed for contempt after refusing
to reveal the source of his confidential information. He had written an article concerning the
Manson murder trial apparently based on information obtained from persons subject to a gag
order. The court balanced the relative interests and found that the public interest in a fair
trial outweighed the chilling effect that compelled disclosure would have upon the free flow
of information. 22 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 349-50. In United States v. Liddy, 354
F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972), a subpoena duces tecum had been issued to the Washington
bureau chief of the Los Angeles Times ordering the production of information obtained during
an interview with Alfred C. Baldwin, a government witness in the case. The Watergate
defendants, charged with conspiracy, unlawful interception of oral and wire communications,
and burglary, sought Baldwin's interview statements for impeachment purposes. Id. at 212.
Finding that the defendants' right to a fair trial outweighed the adverse impact of disclosure
upon freedom of the press, the court refused to quash the subpoena. Commenting upon the
use of a balancing approach in determining the existence of a privilege, Judge Sirica stated
that "[i]f the 'striking of a proper balance' is required . . . this Court will always strike
the balance in favor of due process." Id. at 215.
57 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974).
Id. at 269, 315 A.2d at 255.
Id. at 271, 315 A.2d at 256.
23 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1977
Since the court limited its holding to discovery proceedings, 0 it is unclear
whether the same result would be reached if a reporter invoked the privi-
lege at a criminal trial.
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, in Brown v. Common-
wealth,8 ' sustained the assertion of a qualified privilege at a criminal
trial. The Brown defendant had appealed his murder conviction, alleging
that the trial court erred in refusing to compel a reporter to reveal the
source of a published account of the crime. 2 In sustaining the determina-
tion of the lower court, the supreme court noted:
[A]s a news-gathering mechanism, a newsman's privilege of confidentiality
of information and identity of his source is an important catalyst to the free
flow of information guaranteed by the freedom of press clause of the First
Amendment. Unknown at common law, it is a privilege related to the First
Amendment and not a First Amendment right, absolute, universal, and para-
mount to all other rights."
This privilege is defeated, the Brown court stated, only when it conflicts
with the defendant's right to a fair trial. Thus, if there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the reporter's information is material to the estab-
lishment of an element of the crime or defense, to a reduction in the
classification of the crime charged, or to mitigation of the penalty, the
privilege will be denied. 4 Weighing the defendant's right to a fair trial
against the first amendment interests at stake, the court determined that
the privilege should be recognized since the testimony sought to be ob-
tained was not material and essential to a fair trial."
This discussion of the criminal cases involving the constitutional priv-
ilege issue seems to reveal a developing trend. Clearly, some courts will
recognize a qualified privilege in a criminal proceeding. The courts that
recognize the privilege often utilize a Branzburg-type balancing approach
to determine its applicability. Under this test, a privilege usually will be
sustained if the disclosure of information had been made to the reporter
in confidence and the information is irrelevant to a fair determination of
the case.
The Controversy In Civil Proceedings
Although Branzburg expressly dealt with the grand jury situation,
'0 "Since our jurisdiction is limited to the issue certified to us, our disposition must be equally
limited." Id.
214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974).
62 The published information was attributed to a spokesman in the sheriff's department. Id.
at 756, 204 S.E.2d at 430.
11 Id. at 757, 204 S.E.2d at 431 (emphasis in original).
" Id.
,3 Id. The court stated that "[s]ince the inconsistent statements were collateral and not
material, the identity of the source was irrelevant." Id. at 758, 204 S.E.2d at 431.
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some courts have applied its holding to civil proceedings."6 Usually, how-
ever, a balancing approach is applied in civil cases. 7 Therefore, a reporter
often will be able to rely on a constitutional privilege. 8 In Loadholtz v.
Fields,'6 9 for example, the court held that in the absence of a compelling
state interest a reporter may not be forced to. disclose his sources."0 More-
over, the court found that information obtained by a reporter may be
privileged, reasoning that "[t]he compelled production of a reporter's
resource materials is equally as invidious as the compelled disclosure of his
confidential informants."'"
Perhaps the most significant civil case dealing with the reporter's
privilege issue is Baker v. F & F Investment.72 Baker, which apparently is
the first case to recognize a privilege in the aftermath of Branzburg, in-
volved a federal class action under the Civil Rights Act. Balk, a reporter,
had written an article on "block busting" in Chicago based on information
from an unnamed local real estate agent. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in an unanimous decision, refused to compel the reporter
to disclose the identity of his source since it was not critical to the plain-
tiff's case and could be obtained from other persons.73
In subsequent civil cases, the courts often found a qualified privilege
when a newsman's testimony was sought. The District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in Democratic National Committee v. McCord," rea-
soned that a "chilling effect" would result unless a constitutional privilege
is recognized and therefore found that a reporter's testimony was privi-
leged.7 5 In Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc. ,76 a personal injury action,
11 See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973)
(interpreting Branzburg as extending to civil libel suits). See also In re McGowan, 298 A.2d
339 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 303 A.2d 645 (Del. 1973) (extended
Branzburg to investigations conducted by the attorney general).
11 See Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
But see Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973).
" But see Forest Hills Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 37 Ohio Misc. 30, 302 N.E.2d 593 (C.P.
Licking County 1973), wherein the court refused to find that a reporter's information was
constitutionally protected but applied a statutory privilege which protected the source of
information.
389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (mem.).
7o In Loadholtz, a newsman had reported an arrested couple's claim that they were harassed
by the police. In a subsequent civil action against the couple, the reporter was subpoenaed,
but refused to produce certain materials or testify.
11 Id. at 1303.
72 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973), discussed in 53 B.U.L. REv.
497 (1973).
71 470 F.2d at 783.
1, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (mem.).
71 Id. at 1398. McCord involved a civil damage suit arising out of the break-in at the Water-
gate. Ten subpoenas had been served on various newspapers and magazines on behalf of the
Committee to Re-elect the President. The subpoenas were broad, covering all materials
relating to the break-in. Id. at 1395. In upholding the first amendment claim of privilege, the
court emphasized the importance to the public of political investigative reporting and refused
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the privilege was extended to cover the chief executive officer of a medical
newsletter. The finding of privilege, however, seems to have been based on
the availability of other individuals who possessed the requisite informa-
tion.77 Finally, in a recent decision, Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp.,78 the
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled that during discov-
ery a qualified privilege protects confidential sources but not unconfiden-
tial information.7" Gilbert seems to have afforded newsmen more protec-
tion than prior cases. In distinguishing Branzburg and finding it inapplica-
ble to civil proceedings, the court applied a balancing approach under
which information must be crucial to the case and otherwise unobtainable
to be privileged.8 0 The court further stated that only in "rare and compel-
ling circumstances" would there be sufficient grounds to defeat the first
amendment privilege.8
Based upon this analysis of the civil cases dealing with the question
of a constitutional privilege, it may be concluded that it is more probable
that a journalist will be permitted a privilege in civil proceedings than in
criminal proceedings; unless the reporter is a party to the action,82 there is
a likelihood he will be able to claim a qualified privilege in a civil action.
The Modern Trend
A review of the recent case law reveals that the current status of a
constitutional reporter's privilege is uncertain; the future of the privilege
seems equally unpredictable. The presence of certain factors, however,
creates a greater probability that a court will find a newsman's information
privileged. In a civil proceeding, a claim of privilege has a greater chance
to "bind itself to the possible 'chilling effect' the enforcement of the broad subpoenas would
have on the flow of information to the press .... ." Id. at 1397. The court pointed out that
this privilege might be defeated upon a showing that the need for the information is compel-
ling and that there are no other sources available. Id. at 1398.
75 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.), wherein the plaintiff commenced an action against
a drug manufacturer, claiming he was injured by one of the defendant's products. An article
enumerating the dangers of this drug had appeared in a medical newsletter. Both the drug
manufacturer and the plaintiff sought to obtain the source of the article. The court refused
to compel disclosure of the source unless it could be shown that the information was unobtain-
able elsewhere. Id. at 80, 85.
" See id. at 85, 87.
7' 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) (mem.).
I, ld. at 511.
Id. at 508-10.
" Id. at 508. For a discussion of Gilbert see Note, Shaping the Contours of the Newsperson's
Privilege-Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 185 (1976).
12 Courts have refused to grant privilege to a reporter in an action in which he is a party. See,
e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Dow Jones
& Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973). It has been said that the
recognition of a privilege in such a situation would result in "immunity from practically all
responsibility for libelous publications by the news media. ... Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d
631, 640 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., concurring), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
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of being sustained if the reporter is not a party to the action, the informa-
tion is available from other persons, and the information does not go to the
"heart" of the plaintiffs action. 3 When the proceeding is criminal in na-
ture, the probability that a claim of privilege will be upheld is weaker. In
addition to the elements required in civil cases, it usually is necessary to
establish that the information was furnished to the newsman in confidence
and that it is not material to a determination of the defendant's innocence
or guilt for an asserted privilege to be sustained. 4 These additional require-
ments are necessary due to the public interest in controlling crime and the
defendant's right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses. 5 In
a grand jury proceeding, a privilege usually will not be sustained unless
the matter under investigation by the grand jury is not criminal in nature
or there is no valid reason for seeking the reporter's testimony.86
CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic, and a principle fundamental to our constitutional way of life,
that where the press remains free so too will [the] people . . . . Freedom of
the press may be stifled by direct or, more subtly, by indirect restraints.
Happily, the First Amendment tolerates neither, absent a concern so compel-
ling as to override the precious rights of freedom of speech and the press."7
Although it seems accurate to conclude that a reliable reporter's privilege
has not yet developed, it must be acknowledged that in the few short years
since Branzburg, a decision that could have been construed to preclude the
recognition of a constitutional privilege, the concept of a first amendment
reporter's privilege has gained significant judicial recognition. In addition,
the United States Department of Justice has acknowledged the necessity
for at least a qualified reporter's privilege.88 Therefore, it appears that there
See notes 67-82 supra.
See notes 56-65 supra.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] . . .
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor .
86 See notes 47-55 supra.
' Baker v. F & F Investment Co., 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
966 (1973).
11 Justice Department guidelines were issued by the Attorney General in 1970. See Attorney
General's Guidelines for Subpoenas to News Media, [1970] 7 CaM. L. REP. 2461. The
guidelines are now codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. The present revised version
provides:
(1) There should be reasonable grounds based on information obtained from nonme-
dia sources that a crime has occurred.
(2) There should be reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is
essential to a successful investigation-particularly with reference to directly estab-
lishing guilt or innocence. The subpoena should not be used to obtain peripheral,
nonessential or speculative information.
(3) The government should have successfully attempted to obtain the information
from alternative nonmedia sources.
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is a growing trend in the direction of recognizing a constitutional privilege
for reporters. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will be presented with the
issue in the near future and will determine that a qualified reporter's
privilege is mandated by the first amendment. Until such time, reporters
publishing confidential material will not be assured of any protection in
the event that they are called upon to testify.
(4) The use of subpoenas to members of the news media should, except under exigent
circumstances, be limited to the verification of published information and to such
surrounding circumstances as relate to the accuracy of the published information.
(5) Even subpoena authorization requests for publicly disclosed information should
be treated with care to avoid claims of harassment.
(6) Subpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material information regard-
ing a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonably limited period of time, and
should avoid requiring production of a large volume of unpublished material. They
should give reasonable and timely notice of the demand for documents.
28 C.F.R. § 50.10(e) (1976).
